The 'new public management' (NPM) wave in public sector organizational change was founded on themes of disaggregation, competition, and incentivization. Although its effects are still working through in countries new to NPM, this wave has now largely stalled or been reversed in some key 'leading edge' countries. This ebbing away chiefly reflects the cumulation of adverse indirect effects on citizens' capacities for solving social problems, and because NPM has radically increased institutional and policy complexity. The character of the post-NPM regime is currently being formed. We set out the case that a range of connected and IT-centred changes will be critical for the current and next wave of change, focusing on themes of reintegration, needs-based holism and digitisation changes. The overall movement incorporating these new shifts is towards 'digital era governance' (DEG), which offers a perhaps unique opportunity to create self-sustaining change, in a broad range of closely connected technological, organizational, cultural, and social effects. But there are alternative scenarios as to how far DEG will be recognized as a coherent phenomenon and implemented successfully.
Introduction
Defining periods in the evolution of any complex system, such as public management systems in advanced industrial countries, is a tricky task. New developments accrete and accumulate while older trends are still playing out and apparently flourishing. Relatively established ideas move from leading-edge countries or sectors to implementation in previous laggard areas, even as the same ideas are being repudiated or reversed in the erstwhile pioneering locations. And a confusing welter of changes goes on simultaneously, amongst which it is difficult to distinguish ephemeral and hyped-up innovations from those that are fundamental and longer lasting.
Despite these substantial difficulties, it seems clear that a significant change has recently occurred in the public management systems of some influential advanced countries.
(We focus especially here on the United States, UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands.) The intellectually and practically dominant set of managerial and governance ideas of the last two decades, new public management (NPM), has essentially died in the water. This cognitive and reform schema is still afloat, and a minority of its elements are still actively developing. But key parts of the NPM reform message have been reversed because they lead to policy disasters. And other large parts are stalled. Often these past innovations are incapable now of being easily reversed. But even their strongest advocates now expect them to have little impact on altering the overall effectiveness of government. NPM practices are extensively institutionalised and will continue -just as NPM itself did not displace large elements of previous public management orthodoxies, sometimes characterized as 'progressive public administration' or PPA (Hood 1994, ch. 7) . And NPM ideas are still gaining influence in previously rather resistant countries, such as Japan (Yamato 2003) or India (Chakraverti 2004) . But NPM is no longer new. Rather it is now a two-decades old set of public management ideas. Even analysts sympathetic to NPM have been driven to acknowledge that it is 'middle-aged' and generates adverse by-product outcomes, while still resisting evidence of its senescence (Hood and Peters 2004) . We argue here that the torch of leading-edge change has passed on from NPM and will not return.
There are a scattering of proposals for characterizing the post-NPM wave of management changes that is currently under way. Many seem overly optimistic, looking forward to 'banishing bureaucracy' (Osborne and Plastrik 1997) or achieving a 'postbureaucratic' administration (Hekscher and Donnellon 1994; Kernaghan 2000) . In the European Union the idea of administrative convergence has partly been seen as blunting NPM's impacts, creating counter-vailing shifts, especially in regulatory areas (Wood 2004 ).
Our take here highlights the central importance of IT-based changes in management systems and in methods of interacting with citizens and other services-users in civil society, in underpinning and integrating current bureaucratic adaptations. We see this influence as having effects not in any direct technologically determined way but via a wide range of cognitive, behavioural, organizational, political, and cultural changes that are linked to information systems broadly construed. We term this new constellation of ideas and reform changes 'Digital era Governance' (DEG for short). The label highlights the central role that IT and information system changes now play in a wide-ranging series of alterations in how public services are organized as business processes and delivered to citizens or customers.
There has long been a significant divorce in the public management field between the practical and empirical centrality of IT and information changes on the one hand and their marginality, indeed almost complete absence, from central texts in public management theory and the literature on public sector change on the other.
1 This situation has not been corrected by a few accounts verbally over-tilting the other way by implausibly predicting egovernment utopias, or already claiming the construction of a 'virtual state' (Accenture 2004; Fountain 2001) . (By contrast, we stress below that DEG is a movement of the digital era in society at large. But DEG is not a solely or even primarily about digital changes.) The general neglect of IT in public management theory has been an unhealthy divorce, tending to marginalize its influence on practical policy-making. We seek to redress this deficit, reemphasizing that IT and information system influences are as salient in current public sector management as they are fundamental in contemporary Weberian rationalization processes.
Our central aim here is to define digital era governance by comparison and contrast with its immediate predecessor NPM. The first section of the article reviews the arguments explaining NPM's current stagnation. The second part outlines the contrasting lineaments of DEG and itemizes its major components and how they inter-relate. The conclusions sketch some scenarios for implementation.
The Crisis of New Public Management
There is now a substantial branch industry in defining how new public management should be conceptualized and how NPM has changed, in particular as it has evolved through the New Zealand, Australian, UK and latterly European public administration systems. The result is that 'NPM is a slippery label' (Manning 2000) . Different conceptualisations of NPM all stress different things. For Barzelay (2000, 156) it 'is primarily concerned with the systematic analysis and management of public management policy. This policy-domain relates to all government-wide, centrally managed institutional rules and routines affecting the public management process'. Rival conceptions characterize NPM in terms of specific policy principles, of 'trait' policy interventions seen as typical, or as an overall 'paradigm' for reforming government institutions. But even amongst these accounts NPM is variously characterized. Sometimes it is represented as copying business managerialism (of a now older kind) and in terms of unusually strong customer service orientation. But at other times NPM is defined in terms of internal organizational cultures and the use of a repertoire of more individualist, less hierarchist organizational control mechanisms (Hood 1998) . Some conceptions additionally seem to assimilate NPM into strongly normative concepts, as in Aucoin's (1995) discussion of 'the well performing organization'.
Our approach here recognizes NPM as a two-level phenomenon (Dunleavy 1997) . It has been, first, a strongly developed and coherent theory of managerial change based on importing into the public sector central concepts from (relatively) modern business practices and public choice-influenced theory. The three chief integrating themes in NPM have focused on:
• Disaggregation. Splitting up large public sector hierarchies in the same way that large private corporations earlier moved from U-form to M-form (multi-firm) structures; achieving wider, flatter hierarchies internally; and re-specifying information and managerial systems to facilitate this different pattern of control. In the public sector this theme implied a strong flexibilization of previous government-wide practices in personnel, IT, procurement and other functions (Barzelay 2000) , plus the construction of management information systems needed to sustain different practices.
• Competition. Introducing purchaser/provider separation into public structures so as to allow multiple different forms of provision to be developed and creating (more) competition amongst potential providers. Increasing internal use was made of competition processes to allocate resources (in place of hierarchical decision-making).
The 'core' areas of state administration and public provision were shrunk and suppliers were diversified.
• Incen iviza ion. Shifting away from involving managers and staffs and rewarding performance in terms of a diffuse public service or professional ethoses, and moving instead towards a greater emphasis on pecuniary-based, specific performance incentives. In the public sector this shift implied a movement 'down grid and down group' in Douglas's cultural theory terms (Dunleavy and Hood 1993) . Its impact has been particularly marked for professional groups (Kirkpatrick, Ackroyd and Walker 2004 ).
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But underpinning each of these three over-arching ideas there was a prolific second tier of NPM-badged or NPM-incorporated ideas, a whole string of specific inventions and extensions of policy technologies that continuously expanded the NPM wave and kept it moving and changing configuration. Changes at this level were mostly driven in the first instance by the application of economic, business and public choice ideas to pragmatic problems in public sector provision. But they were only implemented in practice as they were successfully adapted (or managerially and legally 'domesticated') to seem feasible in a public context.
Yet a key part of the appeal of these second level changes has also been that they fit into a wider reform movement and gain intellectual coherence from their link with the higher-order ideas above. Table 1 shows a summary of how these second-order changes have nested within and articulated the three top-level NPM themes. The third column here shows a summary assessment of the current status of each of these detailed NPM components in erstwhile leading-edge countries. For space reasons we focus only on broadly characterizing the state-of-play for NPM's top-level themes.
Disaggregation components
The disaggregation components clearly show the highest levels of reversals or roll back amongst the three. Indeed we argue below that the element of digital era governance that 5 most directly contradicts its NPM predecessor (rather than developing at a tangent to it) is the reintegration of government into more coherent public sector or government-wide processes. In the UK the 'Next Steps' agencification programme once expected to include five sixths of the central civil service, in fact stabilized at somewhat over half the total, and its claimed improvements in services provision have been closely questioned (James 2003; Talbot 2004 ).
In New Zealand, the country's pioneering NPM structural changes have left a country with 3.5 million people with over 300 separate central agencies and 40 tiny ministries, in addition to local and health service authorities. Since New Zealand was lauded by Alan Schick (1996) (Pollitt, Burchall and Pearson 1998) .
But both schools and hospitals were subsequently considerably restructured to foster a more integrated 'community' focus, with relatively high levels of continued central direction.
Customer-seeking MLAs in the UK, the Netherlands and Scandinavia have also stimulated some continuing use of league tables and improved performance measurement, which are the main ongoing legacies of the NPM disaggregation theme.
Competition components
The competition components have generally proved less reversible. But one main rollback (also linked to disaggregation) affected the concept of quasi-markets, which was decisively scrapped in the late 1990s in the UK's National Health Service. (Pollitt, Burchall and Pearson 1998, ch. 6) and some Scandinavian countries, but generally in a more politicallyregulated, close co-operation framework than anticipated by early enthusiasts in the early 1990s.
Incentivization components
The incentivization components show the highest proportion of still-developing NPM trends.
Yet some of the items here are relatively detailed rationalization changes with relevance for digital era public management as well as to NPM narrowly conceived. (Skålén 2004, 251) . And some significant aspects of the incentivization theme (focusing on increasing private sector involvement in public sector provision) have either been reversed or proved far more consistently controversial than exponents anticipated.
Capital market involvement has proceeded furthest in the UK, yet it also created new risks of catastrophic failure and potential losses of refinancing gains which agencies took many years to cope with successfully. The progress of the UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) projects in construction has been disputed, with critics citing repeated under-scaling and rising service charges for hospital projects, but defenders pointing to better timeliness and cost control in the build phase of PFI construction projects (NAO 2003b Standing back from the more detailed picture, we can examine the reasons for the stabilization and wearing thin of the NPM innovation wave, and perhaps also the reasons for NPM's restricted impact in other countries outside the core cases. Figure 1 shows that any new regime or style in public management is at first chiefly assessed in terms of its direct effect on achieving an improved level of social problem-solving, shown as flow 1. For any sustained programme of innovation, such as NPM, this effect must be positive in some respect and some degree -for if it were not so, if the change had no positive impacts on social welfare at all, the policy-sifting and selection process in advanced liberal democracies might be expected to knock the change out of contention or to severely delay its implementation (Becker 1985) .
In addition, there are several possible reasons why even initiatives with relatively tenuous claims to improve social welfare net of the transaction costs of the change may none the less have some positive impacts. For public choice theorists even a stochastic process of policy change might be valuable in disrupting sclerotic tendencies inside the public sector and (temporarily) improving agencies' responsiveness. Some sociological observers suggest that much policy regime change has a chiefly symbolic significance, providing a stimulus for organizations to conform to 'modern' or normatively endorsed influences (Meyer and Scott 1978) . In the public sector similar processes plus high levels of political direction imply that many agencies will extensively adopt changes, even where they are 'inauthentic' for them (for instance, because changes are applied in a standardized way across all state organizations). Party alternation in government can also produce a somewhat cyclical pattern of public sector governance changes, first emphasizing one set of priorities and then a rival one. Where this kind of zigzag guidance pattern develops a new policy regime may have some corrective re-balancing effects for an initial period.
However, with any public sector management reform agenda, it is normal for initially hyped changes, in which high hopes and political capital are invested, to prove more patchy in securing substantial improvements than anticipated. The aging of a reform programme also automatically thrusts the problems it has ameliorated into history, leaving its own flaws and shortcomings as the natural focus of political and administrative concerns. But often more important in the down-rating of reform hopes is a realization that looking only at the direct, intended impacts of policy changes can lead decision-makers to pay insufficient attention to less welcome 'by-product' or indirect effects. These problems are often represented in rationalist accounts as unusual, one-off, unexpected or incapable of prior prediction, an approach that Hood and Peters (2004) broadly apply to NPM's entering an alleged 'age of paradox'.
By contrast, we share Scott's (1998) view there is every reason to suppose that these oftenneglected side implications of major initiatives running via civil society are absolutely inherent, even in societies with the most extensive state sectors. Figure 1 shows that autonomous citizen capabilities for coping with societal problems can powerfully define the final level of success achieved, indicated by the positive flow 2. In addition, figure 1 shows that the level of institutional and policy complexity will always have a considerable negative influence upon the level of social problem-solving, flow 3. The impact of much recent public choice literature has been to cast doubt on the previous neo-classical economics assumption of a perfect administrative agent, and to emphasize the inherent transaction and transition costs (in terms of shirking, shaping or rent seeking) in opting for public sector policy solutions, even with relatively vigorous intra-governmental 'markets' (Breton 1999; Horn 1996; Kraan 1996) .
Turning to the implementation of new public management, the accumulation of difficulties with its solutions can be traced to the fact that NPM changes themselves had NPM's focus on disaggregation and competition automatically increased the numbers of administrative units and created more complex and dynamic inter-relationships amongst them compared with previous PPA systems. Moynihan and Roberts (2004, 141 ) offer a startling example of a complex design map of the highly agencified US homeland security area before the DHS reorganization and the subsequent December 2004 Bush reform to create an overall intelligence co-ordinator. Some NPM reforms touted specifically as increasing transparency have ended up instead creating bizarre new layers of impenetrability, as with accruals accounting. Barton (2004, 281) shows that the literally fantastic financial statements for the Australian Defence Forces make it 'appear to be the most profitable enterprise in the nation' whose 'profits and dividends far exceed those of … the largest private corporations', a status achieved with 'negligible direct government investment in military equipment as they have been largely funded from accumulated surpluses accruing over many years. How can this be, given that the Department is almost entirely dependent upon an annual budget appropriation for its defence services?' (Little wonder then that although a few NPM countries lead the way to accruals budgeting, many OECD countries remain content with older cash-based systems.) Similarly layering new incentivization initiatives on top of, but in partial conflict with, public interest ethos devices (such as life-long career paths for civil servants) created more complex systems than had existed here to fore. Hence again NPM boosted policy complexity and impaired to some degree social problem-solving -a positive (flow 5 in figure 1) plus a negative (flow 3) creating a net negative impact on the dependent variable.
In addition, increased policy complexity has negative effects on levels of citizen competence, shown as flow 6 in figure 1. The more difficult it is for citizens to understand internal state arrangements and operate appropriate access points to represent their interests politically and administratively, the more their autonomous capabilities to solve policy problems may be eroded. This loop may operate in particularly forceful ways in some areas, as suggested in Illich's (1977) controversial general argument that the industrialization, professionalization or technicalization of social life all have fast and dramatic effects in eroding autonomous citizen competences to cope with their own problems, which the formalized systems of provision cannot actually match by providing replacement solutions. If this loop is present then again a negative (flow 6) plus a positive (flow 3) yields a net negative effect on social problem-solving. There is good evidence from New Zealand and the UK especially that NPM changes creating additional complexity eroded citizens' problem-solving capacities, notwithstanding the commitment to improving customer service supposed to be fundamental to the movement.
We can sum up figure 1 in slightly more formal terms: ∆S = f (∆R, ∆O, ∆X)
where ∆ stands for 'change in', S denotes social problem-solving, R the level of direct policy regime change, O the level of citizen competence in the issue area, and X the level of institutional and policy complexity. Holding all other contextual factors except the regime change equal, and assigning lower case letters to serve as parameter labels we get:
which says that the change in social problem solving is the sum of the direct effect of the regime switch (whose efficacy is given by a and magnitude by R) minus the mediated side effects operating though reduced citizen competence (o) and increased policy complexity directly (x 1 ) and indirectly (x 2 ).
Finally figure 1 adds some important feedback loops from the level of social problemsolving achieved to other variables. With NPM, as with any other change in public management regimes, successful problem-solving increases citizen competences and tends to reduce policy complexity, as issues become more benign and tractable. Worsening levels of ability to cope with problems can spiral into vicious circles or even crises, eroding citizens' confidence in their abilities to handle life-issues and greatly boosting difficulties in achieving institutional and policy co-ordination. We could easily incorporate feedback effects lagged by one relevant period in the equation above.
Note that in itself figure 1 leaves moot the overall impact of NPM. In this case (as always) there were displaced side effects of these two primary kinds, and typically these side effects (and any interaction effects) to some extent offset any direct welfare gains achieved. But these propositions are consistent with NPM having a wide range of overall net effects. A strong and direct impact of NPM on social problem-solving might easily dwarf the mediated side effects. But on the other hand, a less impressive positive main effect might not be enough to stop overall social welfare being eroded. Our contention here is only that these two kinds of adverse by-product effects of NPM have contributed strongly to its waning momentum and to the stalling of its impetus briefly reviewed in table 1.
The Emergence of Digital Era Governance
As with any management regime succession, some elements of the post-NPM period's style What is different in the current period is the growth of the Internet, email and the Web, and the generalization of IT systems from affecting back-office processes only to conditioning in important ways the whole terms of relation between government agencies and civil society. By digital era governance (DEG) we signify a whole complex of changes, which have IT and information-handling changes at their centre, but which spread much more widely and take place in many more dimensions simultaneously than was the case with previous IT influences. And, we would argue for the first time, it now makes sense to characterize the broad sweep of current public management regime change in terms which refer to new information-handling potentialities, which make feasible a transition to fully digital modes of operating for many government sector agencies. The advent of the digital era is now the most general, pervasive and structurally distinctive influence on how governance arrangements are changing in advanced industrial states.
A wide range of processes are involved in the shift to DEG changes' primacy, and figure 2 shows that we are suggesting a technological colouration of these processes, but not any simple technological determination of them. The feeding through of technological changes in government in itself has no direct effects upon policy outcomes in the figure.
Instead IT changes work through indirectly in several different ways. The first are organizational and organizational culture changes inside the government sector.
Digital era changes have already triggered numerous significant shifts: a large-scale switchover to email in internal and external communications; the rising salience of Web sites and intranets in organizational information networks; the development of electronic services for different client groups; the growth of electronic procurement systems; a fundamental transition from paper-based to electronic record-keeping; and so on. A tipping point in many organizations' development towards digital agency status is when they move over from files and documentation recognizably the same as those in Weber's day, where the authoritative version of policy is recorded on paper, to holding the authoritative version electronically (usually on an intranet) and simply printing off paper copies as needed. This transition reflects the ineradicability of serious 'version control' problems in any mixed paper/electronic systems. Full digital agency status is potentially achievable by many government agencies in advanced states, especially at the central or federal government tier and in regulatory areas, but of course less so for delivery agencies. In former NPM countries there is an influential additional pathway for organizational change, the impact of large-scale contractor involvement in delivering IT-related administration processes on the organizational arrangements and cultures of the agencies they supply, denoted as flow 1 in figure 2.
Contemporary IT technology changes also operate via shifts in societal information- At every point in figure 2 the impact of digital era governance influences is also externally conditioned. The key influences on primary IT changes are commercial, the demands from the business sector for new capabilities and then the oligopolistic (or in software near-monopolistic) supply-side responses. The major external influences on state organizational changes remain business managerialism, although a different vintage from the now dated NPM influences, with many current effects also shaped strongly by digital era influences. Societal information systems are integrally linked and civil society behavioural changes reflect much more general contextual shifts.
In more specific terms the impact of digital era governance practices can be considered under three main themes. The first theme is partly a reaction against NPM's emerging problems and partly reflects digital era opportunities. But the other two themes are essentially at a tangent to NPM practices, not convergent with them but quite different in orientation. These top-level themes are:
• Reintegration. The key opportunities for exploiting digital era technology opportunities lie in putting back together many of the elements that NPM separated out into discrete corporate hierarchies, offloading onto citizens and other civil society actors the burden of integrating public services into useable packages. Reintegration approaches are not simple reruns of the old centralization phases of centralization/decentralization cycles. Nor are they just variations on a unchanging menu of administrative possibilities stretching back to cameralist times, as the more despairing of contemporary commentators sometimes seem to suggest (Hood 1998 ).
Rather they represent an antithetical (and partly synthesizing) response to the NPM thesis.
• Needs-based holism. In contrast to the narrow joined-up-governance changes included in the reintegration theme, holistic reforms seek to simplify and change the entire relationship between agencies and their clients. Creating larger and more encompassing administrative blocs is linked with 'end to end' re-engineering of processes, stripping out unnecessary steps, compliance costs, checks and forms. It also stresses developing a more 'agile' government that can respond speedily and flexibly to changes in the social environment.
• Digitisation changes, broadly construed. To realize contemporary productivity gains from IT and related organizational changes requires a far more fundamental take-up of the opportunities opened up by a transition to fully digital operations. Instead of electronic channels being seen as supplementary to conventional administrative and business processes, they become genuinely transformative, moving towards a situation where the agency 'becomes its Web site', as a senior official in the Australian Tax Office described this process to us.
We fill out this broad-brush picture by saying a few words about the underlying components in each of the three themes, shown in table 2. A comparison with table 1 also points up the extent of DEG's differences from NPM.
Reintegration Components
There are eight main reintegration components in table 2, all of which stress gathering back together the disparate functions and clusters of expertise that under NPM were fragmented into single-function agencies and spread across complex inter-organizational networks.
Agencification rollback
The rollback of agencification has been achieved in the UK via mergers, re-assimilations of agencies into cohesive departmental groups, culls of quasi-governmental agencies, and the re-imposition of co-operative community-based structures on MLAs previously encouraged to be unrestrictedly competitive, all prominent features of Labour policies from 2001 onwards.
Joined-up governance Joined-up governance (JUG) has been a central element of reintegration in the UK under the Blair government, and its main lineaments and problems have been well described already (6, Leat, Seltzer and Stoker 2002; 6 2004; Policy and Innovation Unit 2000; Pollitt 2003 ).
We focus narrowly here on major departmental amalgamations at central or federal levelssuch as the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in the US, responding to the previous deficiencies of agency fragmentation highlighted by the 9/11 terrorist massacre (Wise 2002) ; the merging of employment service and welfare benefits operations in the UK's Department for Work and Pensions; and the integration of the Inland Revenue and HM Customs and Excise into a single UK national tax agency. These seemingly conventional (outwardly almost 1970s era) changes in fact have a novel character chiefly because of the IT convergences involved in them. For instance, the planned UK tax agencies' merger rests on an extensive IT integration programme.
Re-governmentalization
Re-governmentalization involves the re-absorption into the public sector of activities that had previously been out-sourced to the private sector. The biggest example so far has been the transfer of some 28,000 airport security staff from private contractors in the US to the federal civil service, required by the Senate as the only sure corrective to the problems highlighted by the 9/11 massacre, where the suicide hijackers passed through privatised airport security systems (see Moynihan and Roberts 2002) . 
Re-engineering back-office functions
Re-engineering back-office functions partly aims to realize the productivity improvements offered by newer IT, consolidating 'legacy' labyrinths of discrete mainframe facilities and associated administrative units, which grew up piecemeal in the 1970s and 1980s and were never simplified in the 1990s. In the NPM countries where IT system messes were merely outsourced but not modernized or re-designed, this potential is considerable. The other part of this programme involves the redesign of back office functions, a development facilitated by the system integrator corporations' concern to streamline the demands upon them, which in most cases has proved to mean persuading government agencies to scrap historic processes devoid of current rationale. Business process systematisation may be undertaken 
Network simplification
Network simplification involves a recognition that the characteristic problem of modern bureaucracy is not budget-maximizing officials trying to expand their budgets and turfs.
Instead the bureau-shaping model (Dunleavy 1991) implies that a growing problem will be officials setting up boutique-bureaucracies, creating complex top tiers of regulatory or guidance agencies for highly articulated networks of public agencies and quasi-or nongovernmental bodies (see Hood, James and Scott 2000; James 2000) . The multi-way fragmentation of the UK rail industry provides one of the most exaggerated NPM outcomes here, with at one time in the late 1990s three separate regulators covering rail infrastructure investment, rail safety, and the licensing of train companies. Streamlining regulatory overviews and simplifying underlying networks can stop the creation of multiple management teams in highly balkanised policy areas, each partly making more work for others to handle.
Needs based holism
There are six main components of needs-based holism, all of them going far beyond the conventional bounds of 'joined-up governance' processes, discussed above. Needs-based holism involves a thoroughgoing attempt to re-prioritize away from the NPM stress on business process management and towards a genuinely citizen-based, services-based or needs-based foundation of organization (see 6, Leat, Seltzer and Stoker 2002) . Its implications run throughout the public sector networks involved -dictating new macrostructures, new fine-grain reorganizations, re-evaluations of processes and fundamental changes of management styles and information systems, and new modes of responding agilely to emerging problems. New integrating political authority structures are key stimuli for holistic change because 'history suggests that substantial improvements in public services stem from broader forces in society -from political movements and community action' (Hambleton 2004, 2) .
Client-based and function-based reorganization
Client-based or function-based reorganization revives the now very old fashioned practice (dating back to the Haldane report and Luther Gullick) of reintegrating agencies around a single client group, instead of the NPM focus on discrete business processes. A good example is the Pensions Service inside the UK's Department for Work and Pensions, which pulls together all benefits for old people in a distinct administration. Alternatively a macrofunctional or macro-programme rationale has proved key in the US's new Department of Homeland Security, which pulls together some twenty-two federal agencies that previously operated separately for decades under successive public management regimes.
One stop provision - Interactive and 'ask once' information seeking
Interactive and 'ask once' information-seeking is the equivalent strategy to one-stop provision. Hood (1983) stressed that government agencies need 'detector' mechanisms as much as they do 'effectors', so that how public agencies do information-seeking has as much importance as how they do delivery. Interactive mechanisms (such as using call centres and phone forms or on-line e-services rather than paper-based forms) automatically facilitate agency staff and systems taking a more holistic view of people's needs and preferences. 'Ask once' methods involve a commitment by government to re-using already collected information, rather than recursively gathering the same information many times, as happened under NPM's fragmented and super-siloed administrative systems.
Data warehousing
Data warehousing sounds simple but in the context of most national-level taxation, social security, immigration or security/intelligence systems in the largest countries, it is both a long way off and has radical implications. The normal administrative situation has been that different bits of information are being held on separate often mutually incompatible systems,
with data matches either difficult to do at all or having to be triggered by specific search requests. Instead data warehousing makes case-by-case data available across multiple benefits, taxes or security fields in a pro-active way that can allow government agencies to anticipate citizens' needs or the key risks to policy. And using feasible algorithms agencies can then pro-actively try to match their services to meet citizens' needs or risks.
End-to-end service re-engineering End-to-end service re-engineering draws on these innovations to look for radically different service-provision models. Under previous public management regimes agencies often had perverse incentives to differentiate their services and processes. Despite moving the administrative furniture around a great deal, NPM reformers were actually very reluctant to undertake more fundamental questioning of administrative processes, because of the focus on short-term managerialist savings. Indeed in the fragmented New Zealand system reengineering would pose impossible demands, for instance requiring agency chiefs to envisage their own organization's amalgamation or to contemplate a change programme extending far beyond their own short term of office. The key stimuli for taking a broader view have been all the processes above, plus the migration of key government information systems to the Web, which dramatizes and makes public the inter-connectedness of
provision. An end-to-end approach ensures that project teams focus through the whole process without artificially demarcating their analysis at existing agency boundaries. A common aim now, even within single agencies, is to radically cut the length of government forms (see NAO 2003c). One Canadian social security official recounted to us how a task force asked to reduce a thirty page state pensions-claiming form by half found that they could actually go much further. By pulling together information from existing IT systems previously held separately they could in fact replace the form completely, with a welcome letter and a statement of entitlement.
Agile Government Processes
Agile government processes focus on achieving speed with flexibility and responsiveness, in the process making government decision-making competitive with best practice in the business sector (Dunleavy, Yared and Bastow 2003) . dismissed as alarmist at the end of the first week and no recalls of staff were issued until too late. French hospitals have few air-conditioned wards, so cooling off elderly or sick people was hard, and an estimated 10,000 to 14,000 additional deaths were charted in the heatwave period.
In both these cases, heavily invested and well staffed policy systems handling perfectly foreseeable problems failed because of inflexibilities and slow response times, reflecting cultural barriers to re-orientating policy systems' inertial courses so as to cope effectively with a changed environment. By contrast, a stress on agility comes out of the private sector IT world, where the problems of companies becoming constrained by past investments and losing flexibility to carry out tasks in a different manner within a useful timeframe has been longer appreciated. The agile government concept denies the commonly-held PPA view that government agencies operate in environments that are stable over the long term, with incubated solutions and a premium on achieving agreement amongst diverse stakeholders (Polsby 1984) . Picked up first in the defence sphere, agile government focuses on achieving a public management and decision-making system that is capable of quickly reconfiguring to changing needs and responding to a volatile or turbulent external environment. As the US Navy Secretary said in October 2002: 'We need an organization that is very adaptive, that is very agile and is quick. Instead of having cycles that take years, we need cycles that take months ... because the threat changes …' (quoted Dunleavy, Yared and Bastow 2003, 3) .
Digitisation Changes
The third theme, digitisation changes, is the most closely connected to the impacts of Web, 
Electronic services delivery (ESD)
Electronic services delivery (ESD) covers the substantial potential for most paper-based administrative processes to be converted to e-government processes. Many post-NPM governments have adopted relatively ambitious programmes and targets, as with the UK's pledge to put 100 percent of central and local government services online by the end of 2005, backed by a £1 billion investment (NAO 1999a (NAO , 2002c . In fact, citizens' take-up of eservices here has lagged considerably behind expectations, but once initiated has still shown rapid growth, as in the UK income tax area (NAO 2000 (NAO , 2002a existing holders of paper season tickets were switched to the electronic card, but then card users grew in four years to more than 2.2 million, with large cost savings in ticketing staff, big reductions in peak hour queuing times and increased use of mass transit by passengers, for whom the ticket-acquisition phase no longer featured in their journeys. Adding a webbased card issuing service and the ability to 'top-up' cards credit online completed the disintermediation picture for customers.
Active channel streaming
Active channel-streaming occurs when governments face up to the extra costs and difficulties of multi-channel access, abandoning the common initial position of simply adding electronic service channels to existing capacity. Instead they move to a strategy of actively managing displacement of service users to electronic channels. There are two main options here, incentivizing people to switch via providing e-services with lower costs or greatly improved functionality (as with the Oystercard above); or legally compelling people or businesses to changeover how they transact with government agencies (Margetts and Yared 2003) .
Facilitating isocratic administration
Facilitating isocratic administration is a ponderous label denoting a shift from agency- 
Conclusions
Socialized as we are into disparaging the idea of technologically-determinist processes of social change, most social scientists will be initially sceptical about the transformative potential of the next phase of public administration changes. And it is important to stress that there is nothing automatic about digital era governance processes being widely adopted or forming a coherent new direction for government. Like any other 'over the horizon' projection our predictions may partly misfire. And like NPM before it, DEG may also attract additional components not anticipated here, which significantly change its character.
Comparing across tables 1 and 2 shows some instances of digital era governance processes that directly reverse NPM changes, and many others which are at a tangent to NPM priorities and orientations. There are some important questions in leading edge countries about whether managers and political elites long-educated and socialized in NPM approaches will actually be able to change direction radically enough to fully exploit the potential of DEG reforms (Bastow, Dunleavy, Margetts and Tinkler 2000) . Sets of different scenarios are feasible to the coherent implementation of inter-related policy shifts envisaged above. One alternative 'digital NPM' outcome might see DEG changes very selectively adopted only where they least cross-cut existing NPM policies. For example, reintegration changes might be used to cut staffs but not to combat vertical siloing of government agencies via fundamental re-engineering, nor to significantly improve the quality of service to citizens. Another scenario different from our analysis here might see administrative and political elites implementing conflicting NPM and DEG directions simultaneously but unselfconsciously, cross-cutting each other in counter-productive ways so as to create chiefly a policy mess. A third alternative possibility is that NPM-educated elites may simply be so slow to change public management in DEG directions that state agencies fall further behind the curve of modern rationalization processes. In this case the government sector could progressively residualize as a laggard sector of society and the economy, becoming less and less central in society's information networks and progressively more starved of resources in consequence.
Even if DEG-type changes are apparently implemented as envisaged here, there are also many voices warning of potentially adverse consequences and even policy disasters ahead. Civil liberties groups critique data warehousing without adequate individual privacy rights, especially when linked to ever more intrinsically personal identifiers, such as biometric data and genetic information. At the same time government agencies' capabilities may be enhanced by the continuous (real-time) tracking of mobile phones' or cars' positions and the use of face-recognition software along with CCTV in urban areas, combined with enormously enhanced massive IT storage and search capabilities. The spread of RFID (remote frequency identification) chips in perhaps every private sector product could also expand police or government agencies' forensic abilities. These developments could yet create a universal surveillance apparatus unparalleled in human history, engendering pervasive reductions in privacy without transmuting into any genuinely enhanced service provision for the public at large. DEG changes are also as vulnerable as any previous initiatives to problems of rhetorical self-deception, political hyper-activism and initiatives for initiatives' sake, as perhaps the UK's controversies over introducing identity cards demonstrate. Zigzag government policies, broader switches to and from between decentralization/centralization or agencification/reintegration, can also be cynically interpreted as inevitable cycles, familiarly echoing previous ebbs and flows of 'reforms' which prove in a long-run perspective to be only fads and fashions -the quasi-structuralist view apparently adopted by Hood (1998) .
Yet despite these uncertainties and alternate possibilities, in our view the current period still remains unique. It holds out the promise of a potential transition to a more genuinely integrated, agile and holistic government, whose organizational operations are visible in detail both to the personnel operating in the fewer, broader public agencies and to citizens and civil society organizations. A certain penumbra of fashions and regressions will almost inevitably surround the swing to DEG strategies in leading edge countries. But a strong underlying upward modernization momentum can still persist and achieve cumulative improvements. The aim of a coherent and self-conscious digital era governance strategy would not just be to achieve a time-limited or one-off direct stimulus to social problemsolving like earlier management regime changes. It would also encompass opening up government to others and to itself, so as to create a radically less complex institutional and policy landscape, engineered for simplicity and automaticity in routine operations and for agility and responsiveness in service delivery and government's monitoring of the riskenvironment. Digital era changes inside the government machine would be closely meshed with and run strictly in parallel with increases in citizens' autonomous capabilities for solving social problems. They would go with the grain of what civil society stakeholders are doing anyway, as the digital era unfolds further. For public managers the trick will be to help make it so.
